Rear Base: Ethiopian Territory and the Rapid Support Forces’ Eastern Front

An evidentiary assessment of satellite, documentary and open-source reporting on Ethiopian facilitation of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces, November 2025 – September 2026.

Mohamed Samir, African Narratives President

9/3/202618 min read

Ethiopia Territory and the Rapid Support Forces’ Eastern Front Sudan African Narratives RSF Hemedti
Ethiopia Territory and the Rapid Support Forces’ Eastern Front Sudan African Narratives RSF Hemedti

1. Executive summary

Between November 2025 and September 2026, four independent investigations — by Reuters, the Yale School of Public Health’s Humanitarian Research Lab, Le Monde and Middle East Eye — documented the use of Ethiopian territory to train, equip and stage forces of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) for operations in Blue Nile state. This study assesses that evidence base, assigns confidence levels to its principal claims, identifies what remains unestablished, and sets out the questions that further reporting must answer.

The study makes two original observations not previously stated in the published record. The first concerns a four-day convergence of events in late August 2026. The second concerns a lacuna in the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission report published on 3 September 2026. Both are set out in Section 6.

Principal findings

Confidence levels are defined in Section 3.2.

  • F1 — HIGH CONFIDENCE. Activity consistent with military assistance to the RSF — delivery, repainting and weaponisation of light vehicles — occurred at an active Ethiopian National Defence Force base at Asosa between December 2025 and August 2026.

  • F2 — HIGH CONFIDENCE. A purpose-built facility in Menge district housed several thousand personnel from October 2025, described in Ethiopian and third-country documents as an RSF training camp.

  • F3 — HIGH CONFIDENCE. RSF and allied offensives that captured Kurmuk (March, August 2026) and Geisan (August 2026) were launched from or staged through Ethiopian territory.

  • F4 — HIGH CONFIDENCE (UN finding). Ethiopian nationals serve as combatants in RSF ranks.

  • F5 — HIGH CONFIDENCE (documented). Ethiopia has declined to engage with international inquiry into activity on its territory.

  • F6 — MODERATE–HIGH CONFIDENCE. The United Arab Emirates financed the Menge facility and supplied trainers, logistics and materiel through Ethiopian air and sea corridors.

  • F7 — MODERATE CONFIDENCE. The Asosa and Menge activity was authorised at senior levels of the Ethiopian security apparatus.

  • F8 — INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. Ethiopian facilitation constitutes deliberate state policy rather than tolerated activity within a compartmented intelligence channel.

Central judgement

The evidence establishes with high confidence that Ethiopian territory, including an active military installation, has functioned as the rear base for RSF operations on Sudan’s eastern front. It does not yet establish the level at which this was authorised, nor has any adjudicative or investigative body of the United Nations made a finding of Ethiopian state support. The principal obstacle to closing that gap is Ethiopia’s documented refusal to respond to international inquiry.

2. Scope and purpose

This study does not present original field reporting. It is an assessment of an existing published evidence base, undertaken because that base has accumulated rapidly, across outlets and languages, without consolidated evaluation — and because significant secondary coverage has restated qualified findings as settled fact, while other commentary has dismissed corroborated imagery analysis as unproven allegation. Neither treatment serves the reader.

Its purposes are: to establish what the record supports and at what confidence; to identify the specific evidentiary gaps; to correct errors circulating in secondary coverage; and to define a research agenda for reporting that would close those gaps.

The study is published in advance of the expiry of the Sudan sanctions regime on 12 September 2026 and during the 63rd session of the UN Human Rights Council, at which the geographic scope of the Darfur arms embargo is under active debate. The Blue Nile front lies outside that embargo’s current reach.

3. Method and evidentiary standards

3.1 Source tiering

Sources are weighted according to method, transparency and independence from the parties to the conflict.

3.2 Confidence levels

  • High. Corroborated across two or more independent Tier A–C sources using different methods, with no substantive contradicting evidence.

  • Moderate–high. Multiple independent sources, but resting substantially on anonymous testimony or documents that could not be independently authenticated by the reporting outlet, and formally denied.

  • Moderate. Supported by a limited documentary basis with confirming sources, but without on-record attribution or independent verification.

  • Insufficient evidence. The proposition is plausible and consistent with the record but not established by it.

3.3 Limitations

No field reporting was conducted. No satellite imagery was independently commissioned; imagery findings are accepted or rejected on the transparency of the analysing institution’s stated method, not on re-examination of the images. No leaked document referenced here has been independently authenticated by this study; the reporting outlets’ own authentication statements are relied upon and identified as such. Arabic-language sources were assessed in the original. Requests for comment were not issued by this study; non-responses recorded below are those of the originating outlets and of the UN Fact-Finding Mission.

4. The two sites

Two distinct locations approximately 30 kilometres apart in Benishangul-Gumuz are at issue. Conflating them — common in secondary coverage — produces errors of both overstatement and dismissal, because the objections that apply to one do not apply to the other.

Site one: Menge district

  • Nature: New construction on cleared forest.

  • Function alleged: Training.

  • Primary evidence: Documentary (leaked memo, diplomatic cable), plus imagery, plus 15 human sources.

  • Established by: Reuters, 10 February 2026 (Tier C).

  • Principal weakness: Imagery alone cannot confirm military function; internal numerical inconsistency, see 8.2.

Site two: Asosa

  • Nature: Pre-existing, active ENDF installation.

  • Function alleged: Logistics, refit, weaponisation, staging.

  • Primary evidence: Remote sensing with 14-site control group; open-source vehicle matching.

  • Established by: Yale HRL, April / June / August 2026 (Tier B).

  • Principal weakness: Imagery cannot establish intent, identity of personnel, or authorisation.

4.1 Menge district — Finding F2

Reuters established the following chronology from Vantor and Airbus Defence and Space imagery with commissioned analysis by Janes: forest clearing and construction of metal-roofed buildings from April 2025; tent construction from the second half of October 2025; more than 640 tents of approximately four square metres visible on 24 November 2025, assessed by Janes as accommodation for at least 2,500 people; further clearing, riverbed excavation and dozens of shipping containers by late January 2026. Janes stated it could not confirm from imagery alone that the site was military.

Function is established documentarily rather than visually. An internal note of Ethiopia’s security services, reviewed by Reuters, records 4,300 RSF fighters in training as of early January 2026 and states that “their logistical and military supplies are being provided by the UAE.” A November 2025 diplomatic cable of undisclosed origin describes capacity for up to 10,000 and dates the start of activity to October 2025, with the arrival of Land Cruisers, heavy trucks, RSF units and Emirati trainers. Two Ethiopian intelligence officials and the imagery corroborated details in both documents.

Imagery from 28 January 2026 shows construction at the airport serving Asosa consistent with a drone ground control station.

Assessment: high confidence that a facility of this scale and chronology exists and was populated; the RSF training function rests on two documents plus corroborating officials, and is not independently verifiable from imagery.

4.2 Asosa ENDF base — Finding F1

Yale HRL concluded with high confidence, across three reporting periods, that activity consistent with military assistance to the RSF occurred at the Asosa base. The methodological feature that distinguishes this from ordinary imagery commentary is the control group: the same analysis was applied to fourteen other ENDF bases in the region in the first period and to more than ten further military facilities in the second. No comparable pattern was found at any of them.

Period 1 — 29 December 2025 to 29 March 2026. Repeated arrival of commercial car-carriers inconsistent with ENDF heavy equipment transporters, offloading unarmed light vehicles with livery inconsistent with equivalent ENDF vehicles; carriers matching the colour and dimensions of those in November 2025 open-source video allegedly moving vehicles from Berbera, Somaliland, to RSF forces in Ethiopia; five to fifteen tents with capacity for up to 150 personnel; shipping containers and supply dispersal; white armoured personnel carriers in non-ENDF livery; multiple fuel tanks permitting large-scale refuelling. By February, uniform gun mounts fitted to previously unarmed vehicles, with 1.6-metre objects consistent with .50-calibre barrels arrayed nearby; approximately 200 light vehicles present. At the airport: defensive fighting positions, a new hangar and concrete pad; a helicopter consistent with an Mi-17 from 18 February; an aircraft most likely a C-130 from 9 March. Vehicles matching those at Asosa appear in open-source imagery of RSF combat around Kurmuk, 100 km distant.

Period 2 — 29 March to 21 May 2026. Systematic repainting of light-coloured commercial vehicles to matte dark green matching RSF frontline livery, with 21 May imagery capturing vehicles mid-application. Cross-corroboration with authenticated frontline video showing aftermarket modification: painted exteriors with unpainted white interior door panels and footrests, and overpainted bumpers and corporate logos. Ten car-carriers arriving 10 May. A tracked fleet of up to thirteen large carriers and 25 smaller transporters moving through Asosa town. Following Yale’s April publication, activity relocated from an exposed field to a roofed warehouse in the north-east of the base — assessed as consistent with mitigation of satellite detection. By 21 May: 36 containers and 82 light vehicles, more than 70 at the covered position.

Period 3 — 23 to 28 August 2026. Approximately 100 newly present light technical vehicles in three groupings, roughly six times the number present on 23 August; fifteen vehicles consistent with armoured personnel carriers; at least five with probable mounted weapons; five vehicle transporters and fourteen trailers newly arrived. Assessed as sufficient to field a regiment-to-brigade-size force capable of transporting 750–1,000 personnel.

Assessment: high confidence. The control group, the multi-period consistency, the observed post-disclosure concealment behaviour and the independent downstream vehicle matching together exceed what alternative explanations — border defence posture, gold-mining logistics, routine maintenance — accommodate.

5. The logistics chain and battlefield effect

5.1 Inbound corridors — Finding F6

Le Monde identified Batot Air, registered in Ouagadougou in August 2024 and operational from November 2025, whose Ilyushin and Antonov freighters have never landed in Burkina Faso. Records show at least 36 flights between the UAE and Ethiopia, with transponders frequently disabled over the Red Sea before landing at Bole International Airport or Bishoftu airbase. The company declared share capital of 15,000 euros while acquiring three Il-76 aircraft in late 2025. Its owner is a Sudanese national, Mohamed Omer Suleiman Idriss. Security sources told the paper the airline also transports Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo and his brother Abdelrahim. UN experts told the paper such front companies indicate increasing RSF logistical autonomy from Emirati intermediaries.

Middle East Eye separately tracked UAE-linked Il-76 flights from Abu Dhabi to Ethiopian airports including Bahir Dar, approximately 300 km from Asosa. The maritime and road corridor indicated by the November 2025 video runs from Berbera, Somaliland, which hosts an Emirati facility.

Two regional developments plausibly increased the corridor’s value: Israeli recognition of Somaliland’s sovereignty on 26 December 2025, and Somalia’s cancellation of all agreements with the UAE, including at Berbera and Bosaso, on 12 January 2026.

Assessment: moderate–high. The flight records, corporate filings and ownership are documentary. Emirati financing of the Menge camp rests on eight sources including a senior Ethiopian official, an Ethiopian security note and a diplomatic cable, but Reuters stated it could not independently verify it, and the UAE denies involvement.

5.2 Outbound effect — Finding F3

The RSF launched a Blue Nile offensive on 25 January 2026; a Sudanese intelligence source told Middle East Eye the force came from South Sudan and Ethiopia. Kurmuk fell to the RSF and SPLM-N al-Hilu in late March, was retaken by the Sudanese Armed Forces in July, and fell again on 13 August; Geisan fell on 11 August.

The Critical Threats Project assessed that the RSF “almost certainly launched its operations from Ethiopian territory.” MadaMasr reported Kurmuk was attacked on two axes, from Sudanese territory to the south and from Benishangul-Gumuz to the east, and that Geisan was assaulted from rear bases in the Ethiopian region. The supporting inference is geographic: the nearest significant RSF-held pocket in Blue Nile lies approximately 70 miles south-west of Geisan across SAF-controlled ground.

Assessment: high confidence, resting on convergent independent analysis and on terrain logic that admits no alternative line of advance.

6. Original observations

The following two observations are not, to this study’s knowledge, stated in the existing published record.

6.1 The August convergence

Four events fall within a seventy-two-hour window and have not previously been read together:

The convergence is not itself evidence of coordination, and this study does not assert causation. Its significance is that it places a materiel surge, a head-of-government reception of the recipient force’s commander, and a shift in Ethiopian declaratory posture within the same week — a pattern more consistent with a deliberate change of policy footing than with the incidental accumulation the Ethiopian account implies. It also establishes a narrow window in which any documentary record of the visit’s substance would have been generated.

6.2 The lacuna in A/HRC/63/23

The UN Fact-Finding Mission’s report of 3 September 2026 is the first mandated international investigation devoted to external support networks sustaining the RSF. It names Colombia, the United Arab Emirates, Chad, Libya and Somalia. It contains no reference to Asosa, to Menge, or to Benishangul-Gumuz.

Ethiopia appears in the report in three other capacities: as a state whose nationals were identified fighting in RSF ranks; as one of four states in a subsection headed “Non-responsive states”; and in the Mission’s statement that it encourages those states to engage “particularly in light of evidence of illicit activities stemming from their territory as documented in this report.”

Two readings are available. Either the Mission examined the Asosa and Menge material and found it insufficient for its standard — in which case the omission is a substantive negative finding — or Ethiopia fell outside the report’s operational reach. The second is the better supported: the Mission’s field missions went to South Sudan, Kenya and the United Kingdom; its evidentiary spine is the Colombian-contractor and Bosaso–Libya–Chad pipeline; and it recorded that Ethiopia did not answer its request for information of 11 June 2026.

The distinction is consequential and currently unresolved in the public record. It determines whether the strongest remote-sensing evidence in this file has been assessed and set aside by the competent international body, or has simply not yet been examined. Resolving it requires a direct question to the Mission. That question is the first item of the research agenda at Section 10.

7. The international record

Precision here matters, because both overstatement and dismissal are circulating.

  • ESTABLISHED. A UN body has identified Ethiopian nationals fighting for the RSF. (A/HRC/63/23)

  • ESTABLISHED. A UN body has stated its report documents evidence of illicit activities stemming from Ethiopian territory. (A/HRC/63/23)

  • ESTABLISHED. Ethiopia declined to respond to a UN Fact-Finding Mission request for information. (A/HRC/63/23)

  • NOT ESTABLISHED. A UN body has found that Ethiopia arms, trains or hosts the RSF as a matter of state policy. No such finding exists.

  • UNKNOWN. Whether the 1591 Panel of Experts has reported on Ethiopia. Final report submitted 13 July 2026; unpublished.

The Panel of Experts’ report has been held in the Sanctions Committee since 13 July. Following a Reuters disclosure of its contents on 29 July, the UAE wrote to the Security Council protesting the leak. Bahrain, supported by Liberia, sought repeated postponement of the committee meeting; Greece favoured delay; Denmark, France, Latvia, Panama, Somalia, the United Kingdom and the United States pressed to convene. The meeting sat on 20 August without resolution. Whether the Panel addresses Ethiopia is not publicly known and constitutes the single most significant outstanding variable in this file.

8. Counter-arguments assessed

8.1 Official positions

Ethiopia maintains neutrality in Sudan’s civil war and rejects allegations of facilitating arms transfers or training. Its government spokesperson, army and foreign ministry did not respond to Reuters; the office of the prime minister and the foreign ministry did not respond to Middle East Eye; General Getachew Gudina did not respond to Reuters; Ethiopia did not respond to the UN Fact-Finding Mission. On 14 February 2026 the Ethiopian Media Authority declined to renew the accreditation of three Reuters correspondents and revoked the agency’s African Union summit accreditation, in action Reuters said the Authority informally attributed to its 10 February investigation. On 29 August 2026 an adviser to the prime minister rejected Sudanese claims as “false claims lacking any facts” and alleged Sudanese drone strikes on the Ethiopian side of Kurmuk, Sudanese support for Ethiopian armed opposition including the transfer of more than 7,000 fighters, and the presence of armed groups among 50,000 Tigrayan refugees in Gedaref.

The United Arab Emirates states it is not a party to the conflict or “in any way” involved in hostilities. The RSF and the Gorica Group did not respond to Reuters. A senior SPLM-N figure denied any presence in Ethiopia.

Assessment: these are denials of the general allegation rather than rebuttals of specific evidence. No party has offered an alternative explanation for the Asosa imagery, addressed the control-group finding, or accounted for the post-disclosure relocation of activity to a covered structure.

8.2 The Horn Review critique

The most developed published rebuttal is an editorial by Horn Review, an Addis Ababa research organisation (Tier E), of 11 February 2026. Assessed argument by argument:

  • Argument: Reporting rests on unnamed sources; no named Ethiopian official confirms the facility. — SUSTAINED, as to the Reuters reporting as published.

  • Argument: Convoy arithmetic — 126 trucks at 50–60 fighters implies more than 6,900 arrivals in 48 hours against roughly 2,500 imagery-derived capacity. — SUSTAINED. The strongest single objection in the file. Reuters presented these as witness estimates and did not reconcile them.

  • Argument: Satellite imagery cannot establish intent or identity. — SUSTAINED IN PRINCIPLE, but weakened by the Yale control group, the concealment behaviour and downstream vehicle matching.

  • Argument: No visible training grounds, ranges or obstacle courses. — PARTLY SUSTAINED as to Menge; not applicable to Asosa, a logistics and refit node.

  • Argument: Structures resemble government gold-mining camps. — NOT SUSTAINED. Uncorroborated; does not address the ENDF base.

  • Argument: Geographic implausibility — RSF forces could not reach an Ethiopian base across hostile territory. — OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS. The RSF has twice taken Kurmuk and once taken Geisan on the Ethiopian border.

  • Argument: Ethiopia has no strategic incentive; the GERD makes spillover intolerable. — CONTESTED.Contradicted by the declaratory record, including Getachew Reda’s “passive bystander” statement.

  • Argument: The allegations may serve Egyptian interests. — NOT ASSESSABLE. Offered without evidence.

  • Argument: Authors have a record of criticising the Ethiopian government. — NOT ENGAGED. Addresses provenance rather than method or content.

  • Argument: Secondary outlets have stripped qualifying language from the original reporting. — SUSTAINED, and a principal motivation for this study.

8.3 Errors identified in secondary coverage

  • Conflation of the two sites. Objections valid against Menge are routinely applied to Asosa and vice versa.

  • Recycled reception details. Accounts of Hemedti’s 28 August 2026 arrival naming Deputy Prime Minister Demeke Mekonnen, State Minister Birtukan Ayano and National Security Adviser Redwan Hussein reproduce the December 2023 visit, when those officials held those posts. This study does not rely on them.

  • Misattribution of the Yabus strike. A/HRC/63/23 records a drone attack of 29 or 30 March 2026 on Yabus market in southern Blue Nile “near the Ethiopian border” as attributable to the Sudanese Armed Forces and as a possible war crime. The geography invites its misuse as evidence of Ethiopian support. It is not.

  • Overstatement of the UN record. No UN body has found Ethiopian state support for the RSF. See Section 7.

9. Strategic drivers

Assessment of motive does not establish conduct, but the absence of a plausible motive would weigh against the evidence, and Horn Review has argued precisely that. The record does not support the argument.

Bilateral. General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has developed security relationships with Egypt and Eritrea and aligned with Cairo on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Ethiopian officials assess that Sudan has sheltered and supported Ethiopian armed opposition including Tigrayan forces, a grievance dating to 2020; Sudanese forces and Ethiopian militias clashed in Fashaga between 2020 and 2022. A 2025 Ethiopian delegation to Port Sudan failed to secure a change in Burhan’s posture toward the TPLF.

Declaratory. Getachew Reda, an adviser to Abiy Ahmed present in that delegation, stated publicly that Ethiopia could not “behave as a passive bystander” in Sudan’s war and should not be criticised for “seeking to protect its strategic interests in the context of the Sudanese conflict.”

Regional. Analysts including Goitom Gebreluel and Jalel Harchaoui situate Ethiopian conduct within a Gulf alignment linking Addis Ababa and the UAE against Egypt, Eritrea and Saudi Arabia. Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, an Emirati academic and former adviser to the UAE president, has publicly stated that the RSF “has support from Uganda, from Ethiopia, from Chad.”

Capacity. Yale reporting notes that during the period of vehicle movement westward from Asosa, the ENDF conducted a large deployment northward to Tigray, some 1,500 km distant. A proxy force on the western frontier is consistent with an army committed elsewhere.

10. Outstanding questions and research agenda

The following are answerable by reporting and would materially change the evidentiary position. They are ordered by tractability.

  1. Why does A/HRC/63/23 contain no reference to Asosa or Menge? Directed to the Fact-Finding Mission via the Human Rights Council’s investigative-bodies media office. Any answer — insufficient corroboration, scope, ongoing inquiry, no comment — resolves Section 6.2 and is independently newsworthy.

  2. Does the 1591 Panel of Experts’ unpublished final report address Ethiopia? Directed to Security Council member missions and to the Sanctions Committee. Determines whether the sanctions architecture has registered the eastern corridor.

  3. On what basis did the Ethiopian Media Authority act against Reuters? On-record request to the Authority. No Ethiopian institution has yet been made to answer for that decision publicly.

  4. Gorica Group. A renewed approach specifying the October 2025 movements through Asosa town. The company has never responded to a question containing specifics.

  5. Berbera. Port and customs records, and Somaliland authorities, on vehicle consignments November 2025 onward.

  6. Asosa town. Yale documents transporter fleets moving through civilian and residential streets. There are witnesses. This is the highest-value and highest-risk line; it requires source-protection protocols appropriate to a jurisdiction that has expelled accredited correspondents.

  7. The 28 August meeting. Independent confirmation of the reception and its substance, from a source other than RSF-affiliated channels or Egyptian analysis.

  8. Reconciliation of the convoy figures. Whether the November 2025 arrivals transited Menge to other destinations, which would resolve the capacity discrepancy at 8.2.

11. Implications

For the sanctions regime. The arms embargo established under Resolution 1591 and its successors covers Darfur only. The corridor described in this study terminates in Blue Nile. Every finding here falls outside the embargo’s geographic scope. The proposal tabled by the United States on 24 August to extend the embargo to the whole of Sudan, and the Fact-Finding Mission’s recommendation of 3 September to the same effect, would bring it inside. The African members, China and Russia oppose extension.

For the Panel of Experts. The Panel’s capacity has been the subject of proposals to increase its expert complement. A corridor of this scale developing outside the embargo area and outside the Panel’s published findings is an argument for that expansion.

For regional escalation. Sudan has publicly accused Ethiopia of hosting attacks against it; Ethiopia has now publicly accused Sudan of supporting Ethiopian armed opposition. Both accusations concern the same border. The International Crisis Group has warned that a renewed Tigray conflict, or an Ethiopia–Eritrea war, could merge with Sudan’s.

For accountability. The Fact-Finding Mission has found that RSF conduct at El Fasher displays hallmarks of genocide, and has stated that responsibility extends to those who “order, finance, supply or otherwise facilitate” international crimes. The evidentiary question examined in this study is directly relevant to the scope of that chain.

Annex A — Chronology

  • December 2023. Abiy Ahmed receives Hemedti in Addis Ababa.

  • April 2025. Clearing and construction begin, Menge district.

  • October 2025. Tent construction begins; cable records arrival of vehicles, RSF units and UAE trainers; Gorica Group trucks observed through Asosa.

  • 8 November 2025. Earliest Asosa indicator: 15 cargo trucks, two locations.

  • November 2025. Open-source video of car-carriers from Berbera; Batot Air commences operations.

  • 17 and 19 November 2025. Convoys of 56 and 70 trucks witnessed.

  • 24 November 2025. More than 640 tents visible at Menge.

  • 26 December 2025. Israel recognises Somaliland sovereignty.

  • 29 December 2025. Yale observation period 1 opens.

  • Early January 2026. Ethiopian security note: 4,300 RSF fighters in training, UAE-supplied.

  • 12 January 2026. Somalia cancels all agreements with the UAE.

  • 25 January 2026. RSF Blue Nile offensive begins.

  • 28 January 2026. Drone ground control station under construction, Asosa airport.

  • 10 February 2026. Reuters investigation published.

  • 11 February 2026. Horn Review rebuttal published.

  • 14 February 2026. Ethiopia withdraws Reuters accreditations.

  • 27 February 2026. Le Monde publishes on Batot Air.

  • 3 March 2026. Sudan formally accuses Ethiopia of hosting drone launches.

  • Late March 2026. RSF and SPLM-N capture Kurmuk.

  • 8 April 2026. Yale HRL report 1; Middle East Eye exclusive.

  • 10 to 21 May 2026. Repainting documented; activity relocated to covered warehouse.

  • 10 June 2026. Yale HRL report 2 published.

  • 11 June 2026. UN Fact-Finding Mission requests information from Ethiopia.

  • July 2026. SAF retakes Kurmuk; mass grave of 25 discovered. UN finds markers of genocide at El Fasher.

  • 13 July 2026. Panel of Experts submits final report, unpublished.

  • 29 July 2026. Reuters discloses Panel contents; UAE protests to the Council 6 August.

  • 11 to 13 August 2026. RSF takes Geisan; retakes Kurmuk.

  • 20 August 2026. Sanctions Committee convenes; no resolution.

  • 24 August 2026. US proposes Sudan-wide arms embargo.

  • 27 to 29 August 2026. The August convergence. See Section 6.1.

  • 3 September 2026. A/HRC/63/23 published.

Annex B — Source register

Tier A

Tier B

Tier C

Tier D

Tier E

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