The Somali-Ethiopian Agreement: Extended Reconciliation or Temporary?

The Somali-Ethiopian Agreement: Extended Reconciliation or Temporary?

Introduction

Following the announcement from Ankara, Turkey, on December 11, 2024, of a reconciliation agreement between the Somali and Ethiopian governments aimed at resolving their disputes and tensions, questions have emerged regarding the potential benefits and challenges of this accord. Additionally, the implications of this reconciliation for Egypt's interests within a complex regional and international landscape are being considered.

First: Dimensions of the Agreement and Its Importance

At the beginning of 2024, Somali-Ethiopian relations significantly deteriorated after Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding with the breakaway Somaliland region. This agreement granted Ethiopia access to establish commercial ports and naval military bases in Somaliland in exchange for Ethiopia initiating the process of recognizing Somaliland’sindependence. Since the memorandum's issuance in January, tensions between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa escalated, culminating in Somalia's decision to exclude Ethiopian forces from the African Union mission and the declaration of a new mission set to commence in early 2025.

The agreement, known as the "Ankara Declaration," seeks to de-escalate tensions and threats between the two countries. Notably, however, the agreement does not address the contentious issues between Somalia and Ethiopia directly. Instead, it calls for technical negotiations to proceed, with a deadline set for the end of February 2025. These discussions, expected to last four months, aim to establish a practical framework for cooperation and resolve the various outstanding issues between the two sides.

As reflected in the official Turkish statement, the announced agreement in Ankara is limited to an exchange of mutual understandings regarding the principles governing Somalia and Ethiopia's bilateral relations. The statement emphasized Ethiopia's commitment to Somali unity and sovereignty, in return for Somalia's recognition of Ethiopia's right to access Somali coasts for economic purposes. The statement also stated that the agreement highlights mutually beneficial solutions that do not infringe on Somalia's sovereignty.

Second: Gains for the Parties to the Agreement

Despite the agreement brokered by Turkey being limited to an exchange of mutual understandings regarding the principles governing bilateral relations, without addressing specific contentious issues, it nonetheless represents a gain for all parties involved.

• For Turkish Mediation: Turkey’s interests have been the primary driver of its mediation efforts, as it has become a significant geopolitical player in the Horn of Africa. Turkey maintains strong economic ties with Addis Ababa and has established security agreements with Mogadishu. Ankara’s influence in Somalia is substantial, ranging from humanitarian and economic assistance to infrastructure development and military support, including training and logistical aid for the Somali army. Through this agreement, Turkey has reinforced its role as a mediator in the Horn of Africa, showcasing its ability to bring together conflicting parties and facilitate agreements to resolve various issues. This presents significant opportunities for Turkey to enhance its military, security, and economic presence in the region.

• Ethiopia’s Gains: The agreement serves Ethiopia's interests by securing access to Somali ports, and strengthening its regional and international trade, especially given its landlocked status. It also helps Ethiopia to reduce regional tensions, allowing the government of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to focus on addressing domestic challenges, particularly the armed conflicts in the Amhara and Oromia regions, as well as renewed tensions in the northern Tigray region. Furthermore, the agreement mitigates security threats along Ethiopia's Somali border, where armed groups are active. The change in leadership in Somaliland has also motivated Ethiopia to realign its priorities with Mogadishu, aiming for more comprehensive and sustainable settlements that generate fewer regional tensions. However, it remains unclear if Ethiopia has abandoned the agreement signed with Somaliland, an issue previously raised by Somalia during mediation efforts.

• Somalia’s Gains: The Somali government views improved relations with Ethiopia as an opportunity to strengthen regional and internal stability, ease domestic tensions, and create avenues for economic cooperation. This could also help in addressing shared challenges, such as terrorism and the proliferation of armed groups. While the reconciliation agreement focuses primarily on economic and trade cooperation, Mogadishu remains cautious about granting military privileges to Addis Ababa in its ports, considering such actions a potential violation of its sovereignty.

Third: Challenges

The Somali-Ethiopian reconciliation may face several challenges, including:

• Security Challenges: The presence of terrorist organizations, particularly Al-Shabaab, poses significant threats, especially if Somalia relies on ports in central and southern regions such as Mogadishu. The increasing activity of ISIS, expanding its operations this year, also presents challenges if Somalia depends on northern ports in Puntland, such as the Bosaso port. This makes securing a long land route from Somali coasts to the economic center of Addis Ababa a difficult task.

• Growing International Competition in the Horn of Africa: The region is experiencing intense competition among major and medium-sized global powers, potentially disrupting the fragile stability currently in place.

• Instability in the Middle East: The Horn of Africa is connected to the Middle East via the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, making the region vulnerable to the direct impact of shifting conditions, possibly turning it into a battleground for military confrontations.

Fourth: The Impact of the Agreement on Egyptian Interests

Following Ankara’s announcement of the reconciliation agreement, a question arises regarding its impact on Egypt. Egypt recently supported the Somali government by providing military equipment after signing a military cooperation protocol with Mogadishu last August. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi reaffirmed Egypt's support for "the unity and sovereignty of Somalia over its territory and its readiness to defend it with full strength."

Despite improving relations between Somalia and Ethiopia, Egypt remains a strategically important partner, particularly in military aspects, such as training programs and arms deals. However, Somalia appears to be aiming for a neutral approach, seeking to benefit from Ethiopia to strengthen its economy while considering Egypt as a potential military ally. Thus, improving relations with Ethiopia might reflect a diplomatic balancing act rather than a concession to one party at the expense of another.

Conversely, several challenges may confront Egypt in the coming period:

Security: Ethiopia’s presence on the Red Sea coasts could enable it to control the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden, potentially threatening the Suez Canal. This could effectively encircle Egypt, with the Ethiopian dam on one side and the sea on the other.

Economically: The rapprochement between Somalia and Ethiopia could limit economic and investment cooperation with Somalia, potentially causing Egypt to lose economic and investment opportunities in the region, especially given Turkey'sgrowing influence in the Horn of Africa.

• Politically: The reconciliation could impact Egypt's regional influence, though not drastically, as Egypt’s presence in Africa remains significant and cannot be easily diminished.

Despite concerns over the potential consequences of the reconciliation between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa, it is believed that "Somalia will not risk its relationship with Egypt, Eritrea, and Djibouti," and it is expected that Mogadishu will refuse to grant Ethiopia a military port on its coasts. Furthermore, Turkey, having recently improved its relations with Egypt, is unlikely to risk a new confrontation and will be cautious to prevent Ethiopia from gaining a military foothold in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which could jeopardize maritime navigation to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. These are concerns Egypt has previously expressed to Horn of Africa countries. Egypt is unlikely to be excluded from the Horn of Africa equation, as it has recently succeeded in strengthening its ties with regional countries like Djibouti, Eritrea, and Somalia.

In light of these expected challenges and threats amid the current uncertainty, an opportunity exists for Egypt to formulate a cooperation agreement with Somalia and Ethiopia to achieve economic integration, counter regional terrorist threats, and promote stability in the Horn of Africa. Each of the three parties would aim to safeguard its interests while considering the interests of others, ensuring Egypt is not threatened from the sea, and that navigation through the Suez Canal remains secure. Turkey, being an acceptable partner for all three countries, could potentially sponsor this cooperation.

Conclusion

While the Ankara Agreement represents an achievement, its success will depend on the implementation of its provisions. The technical negotiations scheduled for 2025 will be crucial in translating the agreement into concrete results. Both Somalia and Ethiopia will need to address internal political dynamics that may affect their commitment to the agreement.For Somalia, maintaining territorial integrity while accommodating Ethiopia's economic interests will require careful navigation. Similarly, Ethiopia must navigate both internal and external pressures as it seeks to enhance its maritime access. Turkey’s role as a mediator will be vital in ensuring these discussions remain productive and focused on mutual benefits.

Ultimately, the success or failure of the Somali-Ethiopian reconciliation cannot be definitively determined at this stage. However, if successful, it will undoubtedly affect Egypt, requiring a reassessment of its position in the region and the adoption of proactive measures to ensure the continued preservation of its influence in Africa.