Military Situation Assessment in Sudan 2025

Abstract

This research paper assesses the military situation in Sudan from January to February 2025, analysing battlefield developments in the war between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). It focuses on military gains achieved by the army, such as regaining control of strategic cities including Wad Madani, Umm Ruwaba, and Khartoum Bahri, in addition to international and regional efforts to end the conflict. Based on recent developments, the analysis envisions the future of the conflict, arguing that the army's gains will incentivise continued advances, while simultaneously motivating the RSF to recoup its losses.

Key Points

1. Assessment of the current military situation in Sudan at the beginning of 2025, especially following recent battlefield developments characterised by army advances on multiple fronts.

2. Examination of the most important international and regional reactions to the Sudan situation during this period, notably those of the United States, Egypt, and Turkey.

3. Envisioning the future of the conflict, as recent gains achieved by the army are a significant determinant of the war's trajectory.
   

Introduction

Since mid-April 2023, Sudan has been embroiled in a violent war between the army and the RSF, resulting in catastrophic consequences. This conflict has precipitated a major humanitarian crisis, marked by the forced displacement of approximately 12 million Sudanese. These displaced people face shortages of food and medicine. The war has significantly damaged service sectors such as healthcare, which is near collapse, and has devastated the Sudanese economy, which is expected to contract by 12-18% this year. Inflation reached 218% in August 2024, compared to 83% before the war. Despite these negative consequences, the conflict continues unabated.

Since the beginning of 2025, all combat fronts have seen intense battles, resulting in army advances and the recapture of strategically important cities like Umm Rawaba and Wad Madani, the capital of Al-Jazeera State. This indicates an improvement in the army’s position on several fronts.

Approaching its second year, the fighting continues without interruption. This paper seeks to assess the military situation in Sudan from January 2025 to the first week of February, in addition to key reactions from international actors.

First: Assessment of the Military Situation in Sudan (January-February 2025)

The start of 2025 saw key events and battles in the Sudanese war. In January, the army regained control of important cities, reflecting its progress on some fronts. Examples include gains in Khartoum, and the recapture of Wad Madani, Umm Rawaba, and Shendi in Kordofan State.

The most important battles commenced on Saturday, January 4, 2025, with army artillery shelling of RSF positions in central Khartoum Bahri. Clashes occurred in the Shambat suburb, reached by the army in late 2024, as part of an attempt to advance from northern to southern Khartoum Bahri towards the Signal Corps, to relieve the siege on army headquarters in central Khartoum.

On January 8, 2025, battles broke out between the army and the RSF in the Al-Faw area, between Al-Jazirah and Al-Qadarif states. The army also made progress in Al-Fasher, seizing several neighbourhoods. Clashes also occurred in southern Omdurman and west of Khartoum, leading to the army regaining control of neighbourhoods in the Al-Fateh area. On January 9, the army progressed in Al-Jazeera State, retaking Al-Hajj Abdullah and Al-Shabarga, advancing on the axis to liberate Wad Madani.

A significant development in January 2025 was the army's recapture of Wad Madani on January 11, inflicting losses on the RSF in Al-Jazeera State. Wad Madani is Sudan’s second largest city, holding economic and population significance due to its location within the Al-Jazeera Project, one of Sudan's largest agricultural schemes. Battles in Jelei, north of Bahri, also occurred. After days of fighting, the army controlled the Jelei refinery, 70 kilometres from Khartoum. This refinery is vital as Sudan's largest oil refinery. The army advanced, breaking the RSF siege on army headquarters in central Khartoum, and the Signal Corps camp, following battles in central Khartoum Bahri.

By the end of January, the army had made progress in Khartoum Bahri after securing the Jelei refinery. The army regained control of central and southern Khartoum Bahri, controlling the city entrance from Khartoum, and approached the Republican Palace, enabling advances towards ministries and the international airport. According to Assistant Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Yasser Al-Atta, "Khartoum Bahri has become clean and free of rebellion, from the Jelei refinery in the north to the Mak Nimr Bridge in the south." Control of Khartoum Bahri is strategically important to the army, securing the River Nile State, particularly after RSF advances in the Hajar Al-Asal area, and reducing risks to Omdurman. RSF control of Khartoum Bahri had enabled the bombardment of Omdurman, like neighbourhoods in the Karari locality. The army's control of the Mak Nimr Bridge enables access to the Republican Palace, approximately one kilometre away.

Also at the end of January 2025, the army progressed in North Kordofan State, retaking Umm Rawaba, held by the RSF since May 2023. It is an important city in North Kordofan State, being the second largest and strategically linking central Sudan and North Kordofan, enhancing the army's position.

In early February, fighting continued, with army airstrikes on RSF positions in Nyala, Darfur, on February 3, in addition to violent battles in El Fasher, the capital of the Darfur region. Fighting continues in Khartoum, especially the Soba Bridge area, where the RSF struggles to maintain control because the bridge connects the eastern Nile and Khartoum, enabling RSF manoeuvrability and supply access. Army control of this bridge would enable a siege of the RSF, preventing supplies, which could shift the war in favour of the army.

The military situation from January to early February demonstrates that the army has progressed on multiple fronts, regaining control of cities like Umm Rawaba, Wad Madani, and Khartoum Bahri, relieving the RSF siege on the General Command of the Army and the Signal Corps Camp. Additionally, the army has approached the Republican Palace, and is fighting in strategic areas like the Soba Bridge, control of which would restrict supplies to the RSF in the area. Overall, the army is gaining ground compared to the RSF.

The army controls the Red Sea, Al-Qadarif, Kassala, and Sennar states completely, and most of the River Nile State, while the conflict intensifies over the states of Kordofan, Al-Jazeera, the White Nile, and Khartoum.

Second: The Most Prominent International and Regional Reactions since the Beginning of 2025.

Since the beginning of 2025, various international and regional actors have reacted to the Sudan war, ranging from official visits to pressure on both parties to end the conflict. The most prominent responses are:

• USA: The US administration imposed sanctions on RSF leaders, citing human rights violations and violence against civilians. These sanctions included Hemeti and his brothers, freezing assets and banning financial dealings. Washington also sanctioned Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of the Sovereignty Council and commander of the Sudanese army, allegedly as leverage to promote peace negotiations. This has angered the Sudanese army, and is seen as a face-saving measure due to the US's inability to resolve the crisis effectively for 20 months.
  

• Egypt: The Egyptian Foreign Minister visited Port Sudan in early January, stressing Cairo's commitment to ending the war and achieving stability in Sudan, and mentioning Egyptian efforts to resume Sudan’s activities in the African Union. This reflects Egypt's support for the Sudanese army and its concern for Sudan's stability and security, as Sudan is a vital component of Egyptian national security.
  

• Türkiye: The Turkish Deputy Foreign Minister visited Sudan, meeting with Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan. A key objective was to present the Turkish initiative, proposed by the Turkish President, as a step to end the war and support Sudan's stability. This visit occurred in early January 2025, and the Turkish initiative was initially accepted in Sudan, requiring both parties to issue official statements accepting the initiative. However, the delay in official statements coincided with significant battlefield gains by the army, advancing on multiple fronts and regaining control over areas previously held by the RSF. This strengthens the army’s military position and its ability to advance, especially after controlling Al-Jazeera State, which connects Khartoum and the eastern and southern regions, controlling supply lines and weakening the RSF. This makes it likely that the Turkish initiative will decline for the army as a way to resolve the Sudanese crisis and end the war.
  

Third: The Future of War in Sudan, and the Outcomes of Resolving the Crisis.

On February 8, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan announced the imminent formation of a transitional government. According to the Sudan Tribune, al-Burhan stated, "The coming period will witness the formation of a government to complete the tasks of the transition, and this government can be called a caretaker government, or a war government." The purpose of this government will be to eliminate the Rapid Support Forces. He also stated that "some have offered us a ceasefire in Ramadan in order to facilitate the delivery of aid to the city of El Fasher, but we confirmed that we will not accept a ceasefire in light of the siege imposed by the terrorist Rapid Support Forces militia on the city," From al-Burhan's statements, and considering the army's gains, it is likely that fighting will continue, especially since the RSF needs to compensate for recent losses.

Conclusion

The Sudanese crisis remains complex, marked by a violent civil war between the Sudanese army and the RSF since mid-April 2023. Despite nearly two years of conflict, the war continues, leading to a significant deterioration in humanitarian and economic conditions. In early 2025, the Sudanese army has made progress on several combat fronts, including regaining control of strategic cities such as Wad Madani, Umm Rawaba, and Khartoum Bahri, reflecting an improvement in its military position.

International and regional reactions to the crisis have limited impact, and diplomatic efforts have not yet succeeded in finding a political solution. Recent statements by al-Burhan indicate that the war may continue, with a rejection of a ceasefire due to the continued siege of major cities like El Fasher by the RSF.

Ultimately, Sudan’s future is uncertain, dependent on battlefield developments, decisive military gains, and the possibility of reaching a political settlement to end the war and rebuild the state. As humanitarian suffering continues and economic conditions deteriorate, there is an urgent need for more effective international and regional efforts to end the conflict and begin the process of rebuilding Sudan.