On 1 October 2026, Ethiopia shut its embassy in Asmara and ordered ten Eritrean diplomats to leave the country. Eritrea responded by cutting diplomatic ties. Within a day, Addis Ababa and Cairo had expelled each other's diplomats in a tit-for-tat exchange. Ten days earlier, seven armed groups, several of which had spent the 2020 to 2022 Tigray war fighting one another, announced a joint alliance against the federal government.

Each of these events would be serious on its own. Our new study, Ethiopia on the Brink of a New Confrontation: The Implications of Expanding Armed Alliances for the Future of Stability, argues that their real significance lies in how they connect. Abu Deif contends that Ethiopia's crisis can no longer be read as a single standoff between Addis Ababa and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). The country is moving into a multi-front, multi-actor conflict in which fighting in Tigray, Amhara, Afar and Oromia feeds off itself, and in which domestic violence is increasingly bound up with rivalries across the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea.

A Peace That Paused the War

The study starts with the Pretoria Agreement of November 2022, which ended the large-scale war between the federal government and the TPLF. The author credits the agreement with sharply reducing military operations. He also argues that it left the conflict's core grievances untouched.

The unresolved list is long. It includes the status of disputed territories, the return of displaced people, the completion of disarmament and the reintegration of fighters, transitional justice, the TPLF's place in Ethiopian politics, and a deep, persistent mistrust between Mekelle and Addis Ababa. As these questions piled up, the report notes, the peace came to look more like a suspension of hostilities than a settlement. The study cites the Rift Valley Institute's description of the post-war situation as closer to a "frozen" conflict, and a May 2026 Chatham House warning that tensions between Addis Ababa and Tigray's leadership could tip into wider war if political containment failed.

That warning, the author argues, has now been borne out.

Seven Features of a Widening War

The report identifies seven features that set the current escalation apart from the sporadic tensions of recent years.

Tigray is back at the centre of armed conflict. Relations between the federal government and the TPLF have moved from a fragile peace to open military confrontation, driven by disputes over Pretoria's implementation, regional governance, disarmament and contested land.

The fighting has spread across several fronts. Drawing on ACLED analysis from September 2026, the study points to new fronts in northern and western Tigray, clashes around Alamata, Sekota and Abergele, and advances by Tigray-linked forces and their allies into Afar. The more fronts there are, the author notes, the harder any geographically limited settlement becomes.

The north is erupting while older insurgencies continue. Fano factions remain active in Amhara, and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) continues to fight in Oromia. The study cites Chatham House's observation that OLA activity rose as federal troops were redeployed northwards, a clear sign of a government struggling to spread its forces across several theatres at once.

The technology of war is changing. ACLED recorded drone use in late September 2026, along with attacks on federal military positions, airfields and bases well beyond the traditional northern frontlines. The author reads this as a shift towards disrupting military infrastructure and logistics deep inside contested areas, which blurs the line between the front and the rear.

The Djibouti corridor is coming within reach. Advances by TPLF-linked forces in Afar have raised concern over the Semera-Djibouti route, the artery that carries much of landlocked Ethiopia's trade.

Relations with Eritrea have collapsed. The security understanding that bound Addis Ababa and Asmara together during the Tigray war has given way to mutual accusations of backing armed opponents, quarrels over the post-Pretoria order and a running dispute over Ethiopia's ambitions for Red Sea access. The author warns that this raises the risk of a proxy war, or even direct interstate confrontation.

Tensions with Egypt have turned into diplomatic action. Ethiopia declared an Egyptian diplomat persona non grata, and Cairo answered in kind. The report observes that a relationship long defined by public disagreement over the Nile has now reached reciprocal expulsions, at a moment when Addis Ababa is increasingly framing its internal instability as a product of foreign interference.

Old Enemies, New Allies

At the heart of the study is a changed map of armed alliances. The lines of conflict no longer mirror those of 2020 to 2022. The most striking example is growing coordination between TPLF-linked forces and some Amhara Fano factions, despite a history of bitter hostility, alongside the involvement of armed Afar groups in current operations.

In September 2026, these shifts acquired a political banner: the Ethiopian People's Forces for Survival Alliance. According to the study, the coalition reportedly includes the TPLF, the Amhara Fano National Movement, the OLA, the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front and groups from other regions.

Abu Deif is careful not to overstate the coalition's cohesion. He notes that the most visible military activity has involved Tigray-linked forces, certain Fano factions and the Afar force known as Ugugumo, while other named groups have denied membership or described their involvement as purely political. Citing ACLED, the report points to early signs of fragmentation within the alliance.

The gap between the coalition's broad umbrella and its actual coordination on the ground is one of the study's most useful insights. The alliance does not need to be unified to matter. The federal government now faces a range of armed actors able, to varying degrees, to open simultaneous fronts in Tigray, Amhara, Afar and Oromia. The report highlights joint fighting by Tigrayan forces and the Amhara Fano National Movement against federal troops in northern Amhara, and parallel Tigrayan and Afar operations on the Afar front, as evidence that loose coordination is already stretching federal deployments.

Why Former Adversaries Are Coordinating

The study devotes considerable attention to the question of why groups with such different social bases, territorial claims and visions for the Ethiopian state are working together at all. The author identifies six drivers.

The first is a shared confrontation with the federal centre. The report cites Chatham House's framing of an "enemy of my enemy" logic and ACLED's assessment that the coalition rests on a common short-term objective, with no unifying ideology behind it.

The second is escaping isolation. For the TPLF, rapprochement eases the political isolation that followed Pretoria. For Fano factions, links with actors who can pressure federal forces elsewhere add strategic depth. The author describes the alliance as a force multiplier that lets each member improve its position without merging into a single movement.

The third is military strategy. Spreading pressure across several theatres prevents Addis Ababa from concentrating its forces against one opponent. The report stresses that this works even without a unified command: loosely synchronised operations can still disrupt force allocation, strain logistics and raise the cost of prolonged campaigns.

The fourth is a changed regional environment. Eritrea, once the federal government's key wartime ally, now stands accused by Addis Ababa of supporting its opponents, a charge Asmara rejects. Engagement by some Ethiopian factions with Eritrea and Sudan has widened the room for manoeuvre available to domestic armed movements.

The fifth is renegotiating the regions' place in the state by force. Beneath the anti-government rhetoric, the author argues, lie disputes over power, resources, contested territory and the status of Ethiopia's communities within the federal system. Here the study identifies the alliance's central contradiction: many of its members hold sharply opposed positions on borders and federal arrangements. Military gains could strengthen each faction's hand while laying the groundwork for future clashes among the allies themselves.

The sixth, and the one the author regards as most serious, is the normalisation of armed regional power centres. If regionally based armed organisations can form their own alliances and shape national power balances outside formal institutions, the federal government's monopoly on force will continue to erode. Federalism, the report warns, could become an arena of competition among armed regional actors, weakening the central state without producing any coherent national alternative.

The Cost of a Long War

The study argues that the escalation threatens several pillars of the Ethiopian state at once, and that these pressures become harder to separate the longer the fighting lasts.

Politically, the multiplication of fronts weakens the centre's ability to impose durable settlements and hands leverage to actors able to apply coercive pressure. The author describes a self-reinforcing cycle in which each side treats battlefield gains as a precondition for talks, so that every military advance delays political accommodation. Over time, he argues, disputes that could once be negotiated risk becoming a wider struggle over the basic rules of the state, with national unity resting on shifting balances of armed power instead of constitutional consensus.

On the security front, simultaneous fighting in Tigray, Amhara and Afar, combined with the insurgency in Oromia, raises the cost of every deployment and reinforcement. Drone strikes on sites in Oromia and Amhara in late September suggest the war is reaching into the country's interior, placing greater pressure on urban centres, transport networks and civilians. Meanwhile, the overlap between internal fighting and tensions with Eritrea and Sudan increases the risk of regional spillover.

Economically, the timing could hardly be worse. The report notes that the escalation arrives as Ethiopia contends with inflation, high import costs, heavy financing needs and debt restructuring. While the International Monetary Fund had projected relatively strong growth before the latest fighting, the study points out that the Fund also warned that domestic conflict and tensions with Eritrea could undermine investment and financing conditions. FEWS NET recorded annual inflation of 15.3% in July 2026, alongside sharp rises in some staple grain prices. Any disruption to the Djibouti corridor would push up the cost of fuel and essential imports, add pressure on the balance of payments and further erode household purchasing power. A prolonged war, the author warns, would also divert public money from reconstruction, development and social spending towards security.

A Crowded Diplomatic Field

The renewed fighting has drawn an intense international and regional response, which the study maps in detail. Its central observation is that external diplomacy is increasingly focused on preventing Ethiopia from becoming a theatre of wider Horn of Africa rivalry, alongside efforts to stop the fighting itself.

UN Secretary-General António Guterres called for immediate de-escalation, civilian protection and humanitarian access, and backed African Union mediation under the Pretoria framework. According to the report, several Western and Asian governments took a sharper line on the TPLF. US Ambassador Ervin Massinga criticised the launch of a major offensive and warned of possible further sanctions. France and Japan condemned the TPLF's seizure of airports in Mekelle, Axum and Shire. The European Union also criticised the airport seizures, while raising concern about federal drone strikes. Russia urged respect for ceasefire arrangements and stressed Ethiopia's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Regionally, the African Union remains the principal mediator and backs renewed efforts led by Olusegun Obasanjo, with the Pretoria Agreement still treated as the core framework. IGAD called for an immediate halt to hostilities. Djibouti, whose ports Ethiopia depends on, warned that renewed war threatened regional integration. The United Arab Emirates and Qatar both condemned attacks on federal forces and called for implementation of the Pretoria Agreement.

The most sensitive dimension involves Ethiopia's accusations that Egypt, Sudan and Eritrea are supporting its armed opponents. All three have rejected the claims. The study notes that Sudan, in turn, accused Ethiopia of facilitating support to the Rapid Support Forces, a sign of how easily the Ethiopian and Sudanese wars could become entangled. Somalia, as of early October, had issued no detailed statement, although President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud held consultations with Ethiopian and Djiboutian leaders.

Six Possible Futures

The study closes with six scenarios, and the author is clear that the outlook can no longer be reduced to a simple choice between war and peace. He also notes that the federal government retains significant institutional and military advantages, and that the opposition remains divided in its aims.

1. Containment and a revived Pretoria process. International pressure halts military operations and reopens negotiations. A durable outcome would require tackling the questions Pretoria left open, from disputed territories to the TPLF's political status, and limiting regional interference. The author considers this possible, provided the settlement goes well beyond restoring the old ceasefire.

2. A prolonged war of attrition. Violence stabilises at a high level without becoming a full national war. The government holds major cities and strategic centres while armed groups sustain dispersed, localised fighting. Neither side wins decisively, and the state's capacity steadily declines.

3. A coordinated multi-front internal war. If tactical cooperation among the TPLF, Fano factions and other groups matures into synchronised operations across Amhara, Oromia, Tigray and Afar, Ethiopia could shift from a series of regional insurgencies to a single interconnected war.

4. Direct regional confrontation, particularly with Eritrea. The author regards this scenario as markedly more serious since the embassy closure and expulsions of 1 October. Border clashes or wider intervention could fuse the Tigray conflict with Red Sea strategic calculations, while Ethiopia's accusations against Sudan and Egypt widen the risk further.

5. Gradual erosion of state authority. Fragmentation, the report argues, would probably not begin with formal secession. It would emerge as regional armed actors acquired the capacity to administer territory, run their own security arrangements and maintain external relationships, producing a form of de facto decentralisation imposed by force.

6. Reciprocal escalation over sovereignty disputes. If Addis Ababa folds Red Sea access, dams and borders into domestic political mobilisation, its external disputes with Eritrea, Egypt, Somalia and Sudan could become tangled with internal armed conflict, turning a national crisis into a lasting regional one.

The gravest danger, in the author's assessment, is the convergence of several of these paths at once: weakening central control, expanding regional power centres and deeper involvement by neighbouring and international actors.

Why This Matters Beyond Ethiopia

Ethiopia is Africa's second most populous country, the seat of the African Union and a pivotal actor in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. Abu Deif's study makes a persuasive case that the most important story in the current escalation lies in the slow reshaping of the Ethiopian state itself, more than in any single battle or town changing hands. When armed regional actors can form alliances, open fronts and negotiate outside formal institutions, the rules of the federation start to be written by force.

The study's closing warning is direct. If the current trajectory holds, Ethiopia could move from being a centre of domestic instability to the focal point of a wider regional crisis, with consequences for security, trade flows and strategic corridors well beyond its borders. Containing that crisis later will be far harder and costlier than addressing its causes now.

For decision-makers, diplomats, investors and analysts following the Horn of Africa, the full study offers a detailed map of the actors, alliances and fault lines shaping what comes next.

Download the full study here

Sources

• Seven Ethiopian armed groups announce anti-government alliance (Reuters via Polity)

• Ethiopian opposition groups unite to mount challenge to Prime Minister Abiy (ABC News)

• Ethiopia: Tigray forces seize airports as fighting spreads to Afar (Africanews)

• US warns TPLF against offensive after Tigray forces seize airports (Dawan Africa)

• Eritrea cuts ties with Ethiopia over Asmara embassy closure (CNBC Africa)

• Egypt and Ethiopia expel diplomats in tit-for-tat diplomatic row (The National)

• Egypt expels Ethiopian diplomat in retaliatory move (Ethiopia Observer)

• Ethiopia's inflation surges to 15.3% as sugar, coffee prices soar (AllAfrica)

• Amhara Fano Joins Seven-Group Ethiopian Alliance to Oust Abiy Ahmed Government (DNE Africa)

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