From Berenice to N'Djamena: Egypt's Road Into the Sahel

Goods shipped from Egypt to Chad can take around three months to arrive. Cairo says a new road across the Sahara could cut that to about a week.

At the fourth session of the Egyptian–Chadian Joint Committee, held in N'Djamena in August 2026, Egypt announced an international logistics corridor linking the Port of Berenice on the Red Sea with the Chadian capital, via the Libyan city of Kufra, and on to Douala in Cameroon on the Atlantic coast. Our new study, Berenice–N'Djamena Corridor: Geoeconomic and Security Dimensions and Expanding Egypt's Presence in the Sahel and Central Africa, examines what the project could mean for Egypt and what stands in its way.

Its central argument is that the road itself is the smallest part of the opportunity. The real prize, the study contends, is the web of logistics, finance, industry and partnerships that Egypt can build around it, and that prize depends on security, sound governance and the goodwill of the communities along the route.

What Has Been Announced

The corridor runs from Berenice through Aswan, Toshka and East Oweinat in southern Egypt, crosses into Libya at Kufra, and continues through northern Chad. Official presentations put the full route, extending to Douala, at about 4,300 kilometres. Cairo's stated aims are to cut transport costs, shorten delivery times, make Egyptian exports more competitive and deepen economic integration with Central Africa.

The work did not start this summer. According to the study, Egypt began roughly a year and a half ago by developing the Berenice–Aswan axis, upgrading and dualling the Aswan–Toshka road, and developing the Toshka–East Oweinat road.

Cairo presents the project as the first logistics route linking the eastern and western halves of the continent. It is also the eighth international development corridor in Egypt's plan to become a regional and global hub for trade and transit.

Where the Project Stands

The new cross-border road linking Egypt, Libya and Chad measures about 1,720 kilometres, according to Egypt's Ministry of Transport, and falls into three sections. The first runs 400 kilometres inside Egypt, from East Oweinat to the Kufra crossing. The second covers 390 kilometres inside Libya, from Kufra to the Chadian border. The third stretches 930 kilometres from the Libyan–Chadian border to the eastern Chadian city of Abéché, by way of Amdjarass.

Progress is uneven. Work has begun on the Egyptian section. In Libya, the state contractor Arab Contractors has signed a memorandum of understanding to carry out surveying and environmental studies and to prepare a preliminary design. In Chad, the same company has completed drone-based LiDAR surveying and signed contracts for the Amdjarass–Abéché road. In May 2026, the Chadian government launched construction of that 381-kilometre stretch, financed from the state budget at an announced cost of 354.4 billion CFA francs, roughly $636 million.

On Egypt's side, the study reports that 6 billion Egyptian pounds have been allocated for the first 100 kilometres, and a government official has put the cost of the full Egyptian section at about 24 billion pounds. Two gaps stand out, however. No unified cost estimate or joint financing mechanism has been published for the corridor as a whole, and parts of the Libyan and Chadian sections remain at the study and design stage.

Security is the second gap. Operating the border crossings and protecting trucks across the deserts of south-eastern Libya and northern Chad is a challenge on a par with financing, and the three countries have yet to announce a joint security framework or a final timetable for full operation. For now, the study concludes, the project is a set of sections being built and gradually connected. It is still some way from a working commercial corridor.

Part of a Wider Network

The study places the corridor within a broader national plan. Seven other logistics corridors are under development inside Egypt: Sokhna–Alexandria, Arish–Taba, Cairo–Alexandria, Tanta–Mansoura–Damietta, Gergoub–Salloum, Cairo–Aswan–Abu Simbel and Safaga–Qena–Abu Tartour. Together they are meant to tie Red Sea and Mediterranean ports to production centres and new cities through roads, railways, high-speed trains and logistics zones.

These domestic routes feed into three continental axes.

• Cairo–Cape Town. A road of about 10,200 kilometres through nine countries, from Egypt's Mediterranean coast to South Africa. The Egyptian section, about 1,155 kilometres, is complete. Around 20% of the wider route faces delays because it passes through areas hit by insecurity and political crises.

• Egypt and the Horn of Africa. Agreements with Eritrea, Somalia and Djibouti on infrastructure and maritime trade, backed by regular shipping lines from Safaga, Sokhna and Berenice to Doraleh in Djibouti, Mombasa in Kenya and Dar es Salaam in Tanzania.

• Lake Victoria to the Mediterranean. A Nile navigation route spanning Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, Sudan and Egypt, intended to give landlocked states such as Uganda, Rwanda and South Sudan a waterway to the Mediterranean.

The Berenice–N'Djamena route adds a westward arm to this map, reaching into a region where Egypt has had a lighter footprint.

Why Chad Matters

Chad is landlocked and depends mainly on Cameroon's Port of Douala, from which goods travel more than 2,000 kilometres by road before they reach Chadian territory. The corridor would give it a second outlet, this time to the Red Sea, and open a route for goods from Egypt, the Gulf and East Asia to reach Chad, the Central African Republic, Cameroon and Nigeria. Egypt also plans a logistics zone at East Oweinat, matched by a similar zone at Amdjarass, for storage, distribution and trade.

The study is clear that Chad's value to Egypt goes well beyond its role as a market or a transit stop. The country sits at the meeting point of Sudan, southern Libya, the Sahel and Central Africa. Its stability, its capacity to secure and manage its borders, and the depth of its economic ties with Egypt will therefore shape how sustainable the corridor proves to be, and how much Egypt and its partners gain from it.

The study draws a wider principle from this. The more partner countries and local communities benefit, the more the corridor's protection will rest on shared interests. A route sustained only by a single political decision is far more fragile.

Beyond the Trucks

Egypt's return, the study argues, should not be measured by the volume of exports bound for Chad alone. The larger value lies in the services that trade needs: storage, insurance, dry ports, maintenance, cold-chain logistics, customs clearance, digital services and finance. If Egyptian companies win a significant share of these activities, they can earn from trade between Chad, its neighbours and third countries, and the corridor gradually becomes an integrated system of logistics, commercial and financial services.

The study sets out three practical steps.

1. Invest in the communities along the route. A road thousands of kilometres long cannot be secured by force alone. Service and maintenance stations, warehouses, markets and small businesses should grow alongside the infrastructure, with priority given to training and hiring local residents so that communities gain a stake in the corridor.

2. Build a joint industrial and logistics zone in Chad. Over time, the corridor could move from transit to joint production and value addition. The study suggests starting with food processing, pharmaceuticals and veterinary supplies, leather processing, construction materials, packaging and light assembly, in a location connected directly to the corridor, close to markets and inputs, and with room to expand towards Central Africa.

3. Build a digital corridor in parallel. Fast border and customs procedures matter as much as tarmac. The study points to the World Bank's Douala–N'Djamena corridor project, which linked customs information systems, improved cargo tracking, cut clearance times and upgraded the electronic single window, in line with the African Continental Free Trade Area's trade facilitation priorities. Advance submission of documents, harmonised data requirements and connected border posts should be designed in from the start. Treating them as an add-on once the road is finished would waste much of the investment.

A Second Gateway for Chad

One of the study's most practical recommendations concerns Douala. By its figures, about 79% of Chad's imports pass through the Cameroonian port, and the World Bank's International Development Association has committed about $538 million to developing the Douala–N'Djamena corridor. Pitching Berenice as a replacement would mean taking on an established route with deep international backing.

The study recommends that Egypt present Berenice as an additional gateway that widens Chad's options. Douala would keep its role as Chad's door to the Atlantic, while Berenice would offer a new route to the Red Sea, the Gulf and Asian markets. Developed this way, a Berenice–N'Djamena–Douala axis could become a transcontinental corridor that complements existing networks, with the two ports serving different markets.

The Political Stakes

The study sees the corridor as a tool for widening Egypt's presence in Africa, and it is careful about how that tool should be used.

First, closer ties with Chad could broaden coordination on displacement, border management, organised crime, arms flows and humanitarian response, all issues bound up with the corridor's security. The study insists that this track stay separate from any attempt to use Chad in Sudan's war, consistent with Egypt's support for Sudan's unity, sovereignty and state institutions. It argues that a stable Sudanese state able to manage its own territory and borders would itself make the region more hospitable to the corridor.

Second, the route through Libya and Chad offers Egypt a more regular and extensive presence in the Sahel and Central Africa, through new networks of trade, institutional cooperation and economic interest that complement its existing engagements.

Third, the corridor could link Africa's interior to Egypt's Red Sea strategy. If Berenice attracts part of the trade from Chad and other landlocked states, it could grow from the end point of a land route into a maritime gateway with a regional function, supporting re-exports and logistics services.

Finally, the study issues a clear warning. The corridor should not be presented, officially or in the media, as a means of encircling Ethiopia, or as a way to use Egyptian investment in Chad to win political positions on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam dispute. Its most durable value, the study argues, will come indirectly, through trade, investment and cooperation in education, health and infrastructure, without drawing African partners into a polarisation that may not be their priority.

Four Risks on the Road

The study identifies four challenges that could limit what Egypt gains.

Security fragility. A prolonged deterioration in Sudan, southern Libya or Chad's border areas would push up insurance and transport costs, disrupt the flow of trade and make returns harder to predict. Higher investment and operating risks would also make services along the route less attractive.

Fragmented governance and financing. The project spans transport, trade, investment, finance, customs and security. Without a single institutional framework to coordinate them, the study warns, the corridor could end up as a collection of separate projects, with weaker returns and poorer operating efficiency.

Competitors capturing the best business. If Egypt pays for much of the infrastructure without building an Egyptian ecosystem in transport, finance, storage, insurance and supply-chain management, foreign firms could capture much of the value the trade generates.

Politicisation and militarisation. Presenting the corridor as a security alliance or a tool against a particular regional actor could raise sovereignty concerns among partners and lead others to view it as a geopolitical move aimed at them, raising its political cost and narrowing its partnerships.

Underlying all four is the question of local acceptance. If jobs, training, services and market activity remain thin, communities may come to see the corridor as a channel for extracting value. That would weaken the willingness of governments and residents to help protect it. Clear development gains along the whole route, the study concludes, are a basic condition of the corridor's legitimacy.

An Interest Corridor

The study's conclusion turns on a simple contrast. If the project stays limited to trucking, its benefits will rise and fall with the volume of direct trade. Connected to companies, banks, industrial zones and logistics services, and supported by digitalisation, training, border coordination and early-warning mechanisms, it could give Egypt new economic and strategic depth in Africa.

Getting there requires balancing three considerations: protecting the corridor without militarising it; maximising Egypt's share of the economic value without eroding its partners' gains; and expanding Egypt's presence in the Sahel and Central Africa without turning the project into an axis of confrontation.

The study's phrase for this is an "interest corridor", one that links security with development, transport with industry, and the Red Sea with the African interior. Whether the road lives up to that idea will be decided by the partnerships Egypt builds along every kilometre of it.

Download the full study here

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